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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Applicability of § 5 of the Administrative
Procedure Act to Deportation Proceedings-After a hearing before an
immigrant inspector, it was ordered that the petitioner be deported. The
petitioner sought release from custody by habeas corpus proceedings and
contended that the hearing did not comply with § 5 of the Administrative
Procedure Act in that there was not a separation of the prosecuting and
quasi-judicial functions.' Both the District and Circuit courts held that
the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to deportation proceed-
ings.2  On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
constitutive statute requires a hearing on the record and therefore meets
the prerequisite for the application of the formal procedures of § 5. Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 70 Sup. Ct. 445 (1950).
The practice mainly objected to by the petitioner was the failure to
separate the prosecuting and quasi-judicial functions of the agency under
§ 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act since the other formal require-
ments for adjudication under § 5 have been regularly followed by the Im-
migration Service.3 The requirements of § 5 are only applicable, however,
where the adjudication is ". . . required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 4 While the Immigration
Act is silent as to the necessity for a hearing on the record in deportation
proceedings, 5 the requirement of a hearing has been read into it to satisfy
the constitutional requisites of "due process". The question thus pre-
sented was whether the constitutive statute must expressly provide for a
hearing or whether the interpretation of the statute by the courts to the
effect that it requires a hearing is sufficient for § 5 to apply. The only other
decision found in which the question was considered was that of a District
Court.7 Although other courts were faced with the question of the appli-
cability of the Administrative Procedure Act to deportation proceedings,
they never reached the point of interpreting the limiting phrase of § 5.8
1. 60 STAT. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1946).
2. 80 F. Supp. 235 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
3. 7 N.Y.U. LAW INST. Paoc. 296 (1947), address by the Commissioner of Im-
migration and Naturalization.
4.[Italics mpplied.] 60 STAT. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1946). Sections 7, 8, and
11 are also made to apply.
5. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C. 155(a) (1946).
6. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S.
454 (1920) ; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
7. Eisler v. Clark, 77 F.Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1948), 97 U. oF PA. L. REV. 271
(1948) (held that § 5 applied to deportation proceedings).
8. Azzolini v. Watkins, 172 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949), affirming, 81 F. Supp. 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); Chow Kau v. Clark, 83 F. Supp. 969 (D.D.C. 1949); Yanish
v. Wixon, 81 F.Supp. 499 (N.D. Cal. 1948). These cases held that the exemption
proviso of § 7(a) which states that nothing in the APA shall be deemed to supersede
the conauct of specified classes of proceedings provided for by the constitutive statute
applied to deportation proceedings because the Immigration Act provides that the
immigrant officer shall have the power to examine aliens seeking to reside in the
United States. This contention was rejected in the instant case at 455, Mr. Justice
Reed dissenting. 39 STAT. 885 (1917), 8 U.S.C. § 152 (1946). See also Yiakoumis
v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Va. 1949) (held that deportation proceedings are
exempted under § 5 from the APA because they are foreign affairs functions).
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The Supreme Court laid down the test that the limiting words of § 5
exempt hearings which the agencies may hold by regulation, rule, custom,
or special dispensation, but not those held by compulsion, i.e., those re-
quired by statute or Constitution.9
The instant decision in compelling the separation of functions in de-
portation proceedings has placed the burden on the Immigration Service
of appointing additional examiners in conformity with § 11 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. Although deportation is not a criminal proceed-
ing, it is an extremely harsh measure,' and when the additional safeguard
to the rights of the alien provided by the separation of functions is weighed
against the inconvenience and added expense to the Bureau, it seems that
the protection of the alien should prevail. While the test as laid down by
Mr. Justice Jackson provides the correct result in the instant case, it may
be too broad when considering other types of hearings. The test demands
that wherever the Constitution requires a hearing, that hearing must com-
ply with the formal procedures of §§ 5, 7, 8, and 11. But the require-
ments of "due process" may often be met by the most informal type of
hearing. To make all such hearings formal ones may impose a heavy
burden on the agency, reduce the flexibility of the agency concerned, and
give force to the charge of those foes of the Act who say that it is a
"straight jacket".
Administrative Law-F. T. C. Authorized to Require Reports of
Compliance With Orders and Decrees-Proceedings begun by the
Federal Trade Commission in 1940 against respondents Morton Salt and
International Salt Companies culminated in a 1943 decree ordering these
companies to cease and desist from certain business practices.' The decree
reserved jurisdiction to the court to enter such further orders as might be-
come necessary to enforce compliance, but was without prejudice to the
United States to sue and recover civil penalties, or to the right of the Com-
mission to initiate contempt proceedings, in case of violation. In 1947 the
F.T.C. of its own motion ordered detailed reports to be filed by respondents
showing their manner of compliance with the court's decree.2 The respond-
ents having declined, action was brought by the F.T.C. seeking writs of
mandamus, together with judgment for $100 per day while default con-
tinued.3 The Supreme Court held that the Commission's procedure was
authorized by Sections 5 and 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,4 and
that it did not constitute an interference with the court's powers or its de-
cree. U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 357 (1950).
9. Instant case at 454.
10. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
1. Salt Producers Ass'n v. F.T.C., 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943).
2. The Commission required a "complete statement" of the "prices, terms, and
conditions of sale of salt, together with books or compilations of freight rates used
in calculating delivered prices, price lists and price announcements distributed, pub-
lished or employed in marketing salt from and after January 1, 1944." U.S. v.
Morton Salt Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 357, 361 (1950).
3. The suit was based on Sections 9 and 10 of the F.T.C. Act. 38 STAT. 722, 723
(1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1946). It was twice dismissed below: U.S. v. Morton
Salt Co., 80 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ill. 1948); U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 174 F.2d
703 (7th Cir. 1949).
4. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1946); 38 STAT. 721
(1914), 15 U.S.C. §46 (1946).
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Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act was intended to pre-
scribe the complete procedure for enforcement of commission orders
through the use of penalties for violation subject to judicial review. No
mention is made therein of the F.T.C.'s investigatory powers. Section 6
does give broad power to inquire into business practices, including the right
to require annual and special reports from corporations.6 Though it
would appear from the Act that Sections 5 and 6 should be used together,
legislative history suggests the opposite conclusion. The F.T.C. was to
have two separate functions. Whereas the Commission was to pursue the
new task of policing competition, it was also to continue the economic sur-
vey work of the old Bureau of Corporations. 7 Considered unrelated to the
former, the latter job was imposed by Section 6.8 It was contemplated
the F.T.C. would require annual reports from corporations for the purpose
of compiling information and recommending legislation, 9 and special re-
ports could be sought if necessary.' 0  The Commission early asserted its
authority to require special reports of compliance with court decrees," but
none were actually demanded for many years.12 Not until the instant de-
cision has any court sanctioned the procuring of special reports by virtue
of Section 6 for use in connection with enforcement proceedings under Sec-
tion 5.13 The right of the Commission to investigate compliance has been
upheld, but no court has permitted the burden of preparing reports to be
shifted to corporations.
The decision of the Supreme Court has far-reaching import. The
Commission's position with respect to court decrees affirming commission
orders has been clarified. An agency's police function does not cease with
the issuance of a court decree, even though jurisdiction of enforcement is
exclusively vested in the court by statute.14  Of larger significance, how-
ever, is the rejection by the Court of the contention that a division exists
5. See F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 434 (1920); Schechter Corp. v. U.S.,
295 U.S. 495, 532-3 (1935); F.T.C. v. Millers' National Fed., 47 F.2d 428 (D.C.
Cir. 1931).
6. 38 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §46 (1946). The power to examine the
organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of any corporation en-
gaged in commerce is said to have been expressly conferred by the legislature in
broad terms because of the Supreme Court's narrow construction of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigatin, 56 YALE L.J.
1111, 1118 (1947).
7. See opinion of Brandeis, J. in F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 429-442 (1920);
Handler, Constitutionality of F.T.C. Investigations, 28 CoL. L. Rav. 708, 722-733
(1928).
8. See F.T.C. v. Millers' National Fed., 47 F.2d 428, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
Henderson, THE FEDERAL TRADE CommIssioN 45 (1924).
9. See F.T.C. v. Millers' National Fed., supra note 8, at 429.
10. See H.R. RP. No. 533, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1914).
11. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 2 F.T.C. 26, 38-39 (1920);
F.T.C. v Sinclair Refining Co., 2 F.T.C. 127, 139 (1919).
12. Instant Case at 366.
13. In F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924) the court held
the Commission's demands to be so broad as to be unconstitutional. In that case
the Commission was seeking information through Section 6 intended for use in
prosecution. In the instant case it was contended that the Court would not have
reached the Constitutional question in theAmerican Tobacco Case had it not con-
cluded that statutory authority existed to support the Commission's procedure. Brief
for Petitioner, p. 49.
14. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1946).
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in the Act-and this in the face of legislative history.' 5  Henceforth, the
right to compel the making of reports under Section 6 may be asserted
for the purpose of insuring enforcement. But the practical effect of the
Court's decision is of greatest moment. The Commission may command
corporations to compile reports; it follows that to the extent such reports
are forthcoming the Commission need not seek information through its
subpoena power and the copying of files. Although the Court states there
is a limit to what an agency may require in the name of "reports," 16 we
are referred only to the broad rules that the inquiry must be within the
agency's authority, that the demand must not be too indefinite, and that the
information sought must be reasonably relevant.17 It is noteworthy that
the Court assumed in the instant case that the Commission was acting upon
mere suspicion.' 8 Nor is the hardship to corporations fully clear without
reference to their procedural disadvantage. Corporations may not test
agency action by seeking injunctions; they must abide suit by the Com-
mission for penalties. 19 As penalties daily increase, the Commission gains
bargaining power, and corporate dispute of orders is deterred. Admit-
tedly the Commission must have information, but a fairer method should
exist to test agency demands.
Constitutional Law-Civil Liberties-Power of a State to Com-
pel Mohammedan Children to Attend School on Friday-Appellants
are members of a Mohammedan sect.' They had elected to send their
children to public school,2 but would not permit them to attend school on
Friday, the Moslem Sabbath.3 Appellants' convictions for violation of the
15. "Respondents are not without statements by the Commission, or its officials,
dita from judicial opinions, views of text writers, and facts of legislative history
which give some support to the (dichotomy) theory. But this Court never before
has been called upon to deal consciously and squarely with the subject." Instant
case at 366.
16. Id. at 369.
17. Id. The court cites Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) as
declaratory of present principl-es.
18. Instant case at 363.
19. F.T.C. v. Claire Furnance Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927); F.T.C. v. Maynard
Coal Co., 22 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1927). For the view that the remedy of the cor-
poration is really inadequate see Handler, supra note 7, at 718-720. A natural
person, however, is not denied the test afforded by injunctions. F.T.C. v. Millers'
National Fed., 23 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
1. It appears, from an earlier county court opinion upholding the conviction of
one of the appellants in the instant case for the same offense, that Mr. Bey embraced
the Mohammedan faith in 1927, when he assumed the surname Bey. See Common-
wealth v. Bey, 92 Pitt. L.J. 84, 85 (1944).
2. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 1421 (Purdon, Supp. 1948) gives the parent the
choice of making private arrangements for a daily course of instruction for his
children. The state does not have the power to compel all children to attend public
schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (legislation requiring
attendance at public schools by all children was held to deprive private institutions
of property without due process of law).
3. KoRAN, Chapt. 62:9 exhorts: "0 you who believe! When the call is given
for prayer on Friday, hasten to the rememberance of Allah and leave off business."
Friday is a day of worship and meditation for the Moslems. HUGHES, DIc-
TIONARY OF ISLAM 131 (1885). On Friday a service is held at which a sermon is
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compulsory attendance law 4 were affirmed and their defense based on the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion was rejected.5 Common-
wealth v. Bey et al., 166 Pa. Super. 136, 70 A.2d 693 (1950).
In conflict with the exercise of the police power in the instant case are
the rights of the parent and the child to adhere to the dictates of their faith.
It is clear that the exercise of religion is not beyond limitation. In Prince
v. Massachusetts 6 it was held that the right of a parent to train a child in
a faith does not include the right to expose him "to all the diverse influences
of the street." 7 In that case, a parent had taken a child upon the street to
sell religious literature. It was a tenet of the parent's creed that children
should engage in preaching the gospel by the public distribution of an
organ of the faith. 8 But the Court decided that the parent could claim no
constitutional immunity to child labor legislation. The Prince case illus-
trates and gives sanction to the long recognized principle that the state's
authority over the activity of children is broader than over like actions of
adults.9 Because the state has this broad power to promote the well-being
of children, it may require them to receive an education. Compulsory at-
tendance provisions have consistently been accorded pre-eminence over
recalcitrant parental authority.10 This has been so even where the parents
claim total exemption from those provisions on grounds of religious convic-
tion.1 Similarly, a parent cannot refuse to have his child vaccinated where
school attendance is conditioned thereon.' 2  However, the reasonable exer-
cise of the police power for the welfare of children is restricted by the
operation of the first Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus,
given. 19 ENCYcLOPEDIA AmERICANA 304 (1947). It is considered tantamount to
a sin to miss the Friday service. MOHAMMED ALI, A MANUAL OF HADIvH 158.
The courts seem to preclude themselves from an inquiry as to whether a be-
liever's practices are in accordance with the dogma of his faith. See e.g., Gobitis
v. Minersville School Dist., 21 F. Supp. 581, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1937). The district
court said: "To permit public officers to determine whether the view of individuals
s-itcerely held and their acts sincerely undertaken on religious grounds are in fact
based on convictions religious in character would be to sound the death knell of
religious liberty." (Italics supplied)
4. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 1430 (Purdon, Supp. 1948) provides for the
punishment of parents who do not see to it that their children comply with § 1421,
s=tpra, note 2. Exceptions are made in § 1422 of the school code in the cases of
children "who for "urgent reasons" are unable to attend. It is expressly provided
that the phrase "urgent reasons" be strictly construed.
5. The first Amendment has been held applicable to exercises of the states'
police power. Gitlow v. New York, 269 U.S. 652 (1925) (a free speech case);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942) (a freedom of religion case).
6. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
7. Id. at 168.
8. Id. at 164.
9. Id. at 168. A dissenting opinion said of this at 177: [since Murdock v.
Pennsylvania decided that religious exercise was to be considered in the same man-
ner whether on the street or in a church] "If the Murdock case stands along with
today's decision, a foundation is laid for any state intervention in the indoctrination
and participation of children in religion, provided it is done in the name of their
health or welfare." But, the majority of the Court at 177 expressly limited its
ruling to thd facts before it.
10. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 290 et seq. (1950). Under the
heading "Compulsory Education," legislative enactments and judicial decisions are
synthesized and discussed.
11. Rice v. Comm., 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948) (parents wanted to
educate children themselves in accordance with dictates of their religion).
12. The vaccination cases are collected in a NoTE, 93 A.L.R. 1413, 1417 (1934).
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in Board of Education v. Barnette,18 the question was raised whether the
state could teach national unity by compelling children to salute the flag
and take an oath of allegiance. The Court in striking down this exercise
of state authority pointed out that children could be required to take history
and civics courses as an alternate means of developing democratic senti-
ments.14 The "short-cut" method of flag salute and pledge was violative
of the spirit of the first Amendment. However, the decision did not turn
on the possession of particular religious views. 15 The Court asserted that
a compulsory flag salute may be equally objectionable to those without such
views. Standing together Prince and Barnette suggest this rationale: when
the state exercises its police power over children the end sought must have
the dignity of purpose of securing the child's welfare; when such a use of
the police power conflicts with the child's free exercise of religion under
the first Amendment, it should appear that there are no more reasonable
alternatives whereby the state may secure its purpose without conflicting
with the child's interests. The Supreme Court will examine the possibility
of alternatives, and invalidate the state action if such exist. 6 In the instant
case, the Court ruled that the free exercise of religion did not include the
right to deny a student a significant portion of his education. The court
apparently considered the possibility of an alternative for the Mohammedan
who had elected to send his child to public school. It concluded that "It
is virtually impossible properly to educate a child who is absent one day a
week." 17
The ruling in the instant case denies these children the right to assemble
with the congregation in worship, an immeasurably potent factor in the
religious training of the child. In view of the significance of the observance
of the Sabbath,' it would seem that some alternative could be found to the
operation of the questioned exercise of state power. It is not altogether
clear that it is "virtually impossible" to accommodate the interests of the
state and of the Mohammedan.' 9  The statutory fact that the parents might
make private arrangements for the education of their children, should not
be deemed a satisfactory alternative because the financial burden might be
prohibitive.
2 0
13. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
14. Id. at 631.
15. Id. at 634.
16. Id. at 631. It is clear that there was no alternative to the legislative means
utilized in the Priice case.
17. Thus precluding home study in lieu of Friday attendance. Instant case at
137.
18. Cf. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court in Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1939). He pointed out that the educational process
could be utilized for the inspiration of loyalty. "That is to say, the process may
be utilized so long as men's right to believe as they please, to win others to their
way of belief, and their right to assemble in their chosen places of worship for the
devotional ceremonies of their faith, are all fully protected." In the Gobitis the
Court upheld the compulsory flag salute. The Gobitis case was reversed in the
Barnette case.
19. It would seem that a minimal accomodation of interests could be made by
excusing children for the religious services. See ENcYcLOPEDiA OF EDUCATIONAL
REsEARcrH 919 (1950). Apparently, the exact correlation of absence and achieve-
ment has not been established as an educational fact. In view of this there seems
to be no ground for assuming that make up work would not be as efficacious in
serving the purpose of the compulsory attendance laws.
20. See note 2, supra.
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Contracts-Validity of Restrictive Covenant Obtained by One
Corporation for the Benefit of Another Controlled by the Same Person
-Defendant, expecting to lose the lease on its hardware store, leased the
building next door from the plaintiff real estate corporation. Plaintiff's
stock was held by a person who also controlled another corporation which
sold hardware. In order to protect the latter corporation, a covenant was
inserted in the lease providing that defendant should not sell certain mer-
chandise within one eighth of a mile of the demised premises. Defendant
did not find it necessary to move, but plaintiff still sought an injunction to
prevent defendant from competing at its old premises. The injunction was
refused on the ground that, since there was no privity between plaintiff and
the corporation which the covenant was intended to protect, no interest of
plaintiff itself was protected, and the covenant was therefore invalid as an
unreasonable restraint of trade. Irving Investment Corp. v. Gordon, 69
A. 2d 725 (N. J. 1949).
A contract restraining trade will be enforced only in so far as it actually
serves to promote trade by affording a fair protection to the interests of
the party asking the restriction.' The restraint imposed on one party must
be ancillary to a contract which has other legitimate ends, and not greater
than is necessary for the protection of the interests of the other.2  The
typical restraint of trade sanctioned by the courts is a contract by the
seller of a business not to compete with the buyer. Such an agreement is
beneficial because of the patent unfairness of allowing a seller to regain
what he has sold by competing against the purchaser of his goodwill.3
Nevertheless, a well-settled exception to the requirement that restraints
may not be broader than the interest to be protected is that restrictions
imposed on a property sold or leased are valid regardless of their necessity
or reasonableness. 4  In such cases the courts feel that the faint public
interest in maintaining the competitive value of a single property is not
sufficient to warrant an interference with the grantor's freedom to decide
on what terms he shall sell. Some courts have even gone so far as to sustain
covenants not to compete when there was no sale or lease of property at
all.5 However, in these cases, the contracts were worded so as to prohibit
competition only at a given location. In applying this exception, courts
have been unwilling to extend it to other than single properties. 6 The
1. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898);
Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt [1894] A.C. 535; POLLOCK, CONTRACTS 319 (12th
ed. 1946).
2. Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); Automobile Club of
So. N.J. v. Zubrin, 127 N.J. Eq. 202, 12 A.2d 369 (1940); RESTATEmENT, Cor-
TRACTS §515a (1932)
3. 5 WILLisToN, CONTRACTS § 1641 (2d ed. 1937); 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS § 775
(2d ed. 1920); Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 244 (1928).
4. Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 (1879); Shade v. O'Keefe, 260 Mass.
180, 156 N.E. 867 (1927); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 516b (1932).
5. Janet Realty Corp. v. Hoffman, 154 Fla. 144, 17 So. 2d 114 (1944) ; Robey v.
Plain City Theatre, 126 Ohio St. 413, 186 N.E. 1 (1933); Horany v. Treese, 91
Okla. 264, 217 Pac. 296 (1923). These three cases in effect decide that restraints
limited to single properties are valid until a real injury to the public can be shown.
They represent a minority viewpoint and have never been extended to broader re-
straints.
6. But see Palumbo v. Piccioni, 89 N.J. Eq. 40, 103 Atl. 815 (1918) in which
the New Jersey court held that a restraint exacted to protect a second business in
which the buyer was engaged is valid. Contra: British Reinforced Concrete Co.
v. Schelff [1921] 2 Ch. 563. Dean Carpenter said of the Palumbo case, "The court
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covenant in the instant case was an attempt to extend a restraint to an
entire area even though the restraint was not necessary to protect any
interest passing under the contract.
The court here chose to discuss the case in terms of privity. While
there is a general principle in the law that one who chooses to take the
advantages of working through corporate entities may not ask the courts
to disregard the separateness of those entities for his own benefit,7 this case
appears to be the first to raise the question of the validity of a restraint
imposed by one corporation for the benefit of another in which it has no
interest (other than sharing a common control). However, contracts in
which the party demanding the restriction has acquired a covenant for the
protection of a corporation in which he himself has a financial interest have
been upheld as reasonably protecting his investment.8 It would seem that
a conceptual rule of refusing to look behind the corporate entity might well
thwart the public interest in reasonable restraints which promote alienability
if it were applied to all cases. Nevertheless the decision may be justified by
the basic policy underlying restraint of trade. As applied to property other
than the leased premises, the restraint imposed in the instant case greatly
restricted defendant's opportunity to compete. Thus even if there had been
no problem of separate corporations, the covenant should have been struck
down since there was a severe stifling of competition which is not ancillary
to the protection of any lawful interest.
Descent and Distribution-Forfeiture Under Intestate Act
Where Both Spouses Committed Adultery Following Separation-
After separating from his wife, husband entered into an adulterous rela-
tionship. Wife, who didn't hear of husband following the separation until
after his death, later began living with another man. Husband died in-
testate, and wife claimed her surviving widow's share on the theory that
husband's prior adultery converted the separation into a desertion, and that
therefore wife's subsequent adultery did not cause her to forfeit her rights
under the Intestate Act. In rejecting the wife's claim the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that where there had been a separation by mutual
consent and thereafter both parties entered into adulterous relationships,
neither spouse may share in the other's estate irrespective of who was the
first to transgress. In re Archer's Estate, 70 A. 2d 857 (Pa. 1950).
At common law neither spouse was barred by his misconduct from
asserting his rights in the real and personal estate of the deceased.' Even
where one spouse abandoned the other and lived in open adultery that
spouse did not forfeit his rights. This unsavory situation was partially
remedied by the Statute of Westminster 11,2 which provided that adultery
completely failed to grasp the theory upon which contracts not to compete are up-
held." Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 244
(1928).
7. Vim Securities Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 130 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1942);
Carozza v. Fed. Finance and Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 Atl. 332 (1925).
8. Fishman v. Fishman, 137 N.J. Eq. 151, 43 A2d 837 (1945). Cf. Dick v.
Sears Roebuck, 115 Conn. 122, 160 Atl. 432 (1932) in which the corporation formed
by the covenantee after the covenant was made was allowed to enforce the covenant.
1. Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308, 316, 1 Am. Rep. 414, 418 (1869).
2. 13 Edw. I, c. 34 (1285).
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by the wife following separation from her husband would bar her dower.
This statute was held to be in force in Pennsylvania. 3 The Intestate Act of
1917 and its predecessors superseded the English statute, the 1917 act
providing that desertion by either spouse for one year prior to the death
precluded that spouse from any rights in the decedent's estate provided for
in the act.4 In construing the 1917 statute it has been held that an act of
adultery after a voluntary separation converted the separation into a deser-
tion as of the time of the act.5 It has also been held that a claimant was not
barred who committed adultery after having been deserted by the dece-
dent.6 This is based on the reasoning that the decedent's own wrongful
act exposed the claimant to "seduction," and that the decedent's wrong
being the more reprehensible, the claimant should not be barred. 7 However,
where the claiming spouse had deserted the decedent and subsequently the
decedent had committed adultery the claimant was barred by his misconduct
regardless of the misconduct of the decedent." In the instant case both
spouses committed adultery following a separation. The court rejected the
contentions that the husband's prior adultery converted the separation into
a desertion, and that therefore the wife's subsequent adultery could not bar
her claim.
Though decided under the 1917 act which has been superseded by the
Intestate Act of 1947,10 the rule laid down in the instant case must be con-
sidered as vital law in Pennsylvania today since the 1947 act retains the
same provisions relative to forfeiture on desertion as were in the 1917 act.
By retaining these same provisions in the 1947 act as were in the 1917 act,
the General Assembly has tacitly approved the doctrine of constructive
desertion, that a separation followed by adultery becomes a desertion."1
The instant case is a logical and reasonable extension of that doctrine. The
rule announced makes it impossible for an adulterous spouse to lay claim
to an estate that might have been accumulated entirely without her conjugal
assistance during the separation on the flimsy grounds that the decedent
had behaved equally as badly as she but a bit before she had. Although the
policy of the law generally is opposed to forfeitures and hence to any rule
that encourages forfeitures,12 the principles of common decency, equity and
morals justify the result of this case.
3. Reel v. Elder, supra. This statute was received as part of the common law
in a majority of' American jurisdictions. See Note, 71 A.L.R. 277, 278 (1931).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 41, 42 (Purdon 1931). For the history of these
sections see BRAGY, PENNSYLVANIA INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES ACT OF 1947
702 (1949).
5. Lodge's Estate, 287 Pa. 184, 134, Atl. 472 (1926); Bowman's Estate, 301
Pa. 337, 152 Atl. 38 (1930); Fenyo's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 560, 161 Atl. 636
(1932). But cf. In re Seidel's Estate, 45 N.Y.S.2d (Surr. Ct. 1943).
6. Heslop v. Heslop, 82 Pa. 537 (1876); Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308, 1 Am. Rep.
414 (1869).
7. Reel v. Elder, supra at 317.
8. Jac's Estate, 355 Pa. 137, 49 A.2d 360 (1946) ; Patterson's Estate, 18 D. & C.
533 (Pa. 1933).
9. Goshorn v. Goshorn, 163 Pa. Super. 621, 63 A.2d 135 (1949); 1 FREEDUAN,
LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA 531. (1939).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.6 (Purdon Supp. 1949).
11. See Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee's report and comments by the
Advisory Committee noted in BRAGY, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 707 and 708.
12. Id. at 707.
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Income Taxation-Taxability of Stock Dividends Where Divi-
dends Are of Same Character as Stock Upon Which Paid-A small,
highly successful corporation had two classes of stock outstanding-pre-
ferred with voting rights and non-voting common.1 In June, 1940, the
Board of Directors decided to capitalize one-third of the existing surplus.
Accordingly, a stock dividend of 50% was declared on each class of stock,
the preferred to be paid in preferred shares, and the common in common
shares. The effect of the distribution was that the holders of each class of
stock had precisely the same proportionate interest in the net assets of the
corporation on liquidation as they had before the distribution.2  However,
because one class of shares was preferred as to dividends, there was a change
in the proportion of the income to which each class was entitled.8 Because
of this change in proportionate interest in the income of the corporation, the
Tax Court held that the value of the stock dividend when received was tax-
able income.4 Edwin L. Wiegand v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14
T. C. 136 (1950).
No segment of the income tax law has become more confused than that
relating to the taxability of stock dividends. An attempt under the Revenue
Act of 1916 to tax all stock dividends ran into constitutional difficulties in
the well known case of Eisner v. Macomber,5 holding that a dividend of
common stock on common may not constitutionally be taxed. At first the
Treasury Department and Congress gave a broad interpretation to the
decision, and for sixteen years it was generally assumed that the Sixteenth
Amendment prohibited the taxation of any stock dividends at the time of
1. The stock was designated as Class A and Class B. The Class A had a par
value of $100 per share, was entitled to a cummulative dividend preference of $6,
possessed the exclusive voting power, afid was entitled in liquidation to a priority
of $100 per share. The Class B was entitled to dividends of $2 per share after $6
was paid on the Class A; thereafter both classes shared equally in dividends. In
liquidation, after $100 was paid to the Class A and $5 to the Class B, any additional
amounts were to be distributed in proportion to the total stated capital of each
class.
2. This statement does not take into account the possible effect of future losses,
but is based on a mathematical computation of what would have been received by
each class of shareholders if all assets had been converted to cash and there had been
a liquidation of the corporation. See also dissenting opinion of Van Fossan, J. in the
instant case.
3. The Tax Court viewed the' distribution to each class as a separate transac-
tion, notwithstanding it was effected by a single resolution, and based its entire
argument on the fact that after the distribution, the common stock (Class B) was
not entitled to share in the profits until after earnings exceeded $36,000; whereas, be-
fore the distribution, the corresponding figure was $24,000. Therefore, the court
reasoned, the Class A was benefited to the extent of $12,000 a year. Then, looking
at the distribution to the Class B without regard to the simultaneous distribution to
the Class A, the court held that the Class B was benefited because after the dis-
tribution the Class B was entitled to receive $108,000 before the Class A could
participate in further dividends; whereas, before the distribution the corresponding
figure was $72,000. This treatment overlooks the fact, pointed out by the dissent,
that, considered as a whole, the net result of the dividend was to benefit the Class
A somewhat at the expense of the Class B.
4. Under the provisions of INT. REV. CoDE § 115(f) (1). Judge Van Fossan
dissented from the majority with respect to both classes of stock. Judges Black,
Harron, Kern and Opper dissented from so much of the majority opinion as held
that the holder of Class B shares received taxable income.
5. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). This was a five-four decision.
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receipt.0 However, in the Koshland case,7 the Supreme Court declared that
the Constitution was not a bar to the taxation of stock dividends where the
distribution brought about a change in the shareholders' proportionate in-
terest in the corporation. In line with this principle it was held that, where
both preferred and common stock are outstanding, a dividend of common
on the preferred, or a dividend of preferred on the common, is taxable.8
Meanwhile, the statute was amended to provide that any stock dividend
not constitutionally immune should be included in taxable income.9 Apply-
ing this amendment, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue urged that all
stock dividends should be taxed, and asked the Supreme Court to overrule
its decision in the Macomber case. Though indicating that perhaps the
court would overrule that holding if the statute expressly taxed all stock
dividends, the Court in Helvering v. Griffiths 10 decided that the statutory
amendment should be construed as not extending to the type of dividend
involved in the Macomber case-that is, one which makes no change in the
proportionate interests of the shareholder. A few weeks later, in the
Sprouse and Strassburger cases,"1 the Court passed upon the taxability of
stock dividends under the present statute in two different situations: (1) a
dividend of non-voting common shares on voting common, where both
classes of shares were outstanding before the distribution; and (2) a divi-
dend of preferred shares on common, where only the common was pre-
viously outstanding. In both situations the Tax Court, applying what is
often called the "different interest" test,12 had held that the dividend was
taxable income. The Supreme Court thought that such a test was not proper
6. After the decision Congress amended the law to expressly provide that "a
stock dividend shall not be subject to tax." This provision, of course, did not
mean that stock dividends would escape tax entirely. In general, the effect was
merely to postpone the tax. For example, upon a sale of any of the stock, taxable
income would be received.
7. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
8. Koshland v. Helvering, supra (common on preferred); Helvering v. Gowran,
302 U.S. 238 (1938) (preferred on common).
9. See 115(f) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1936; now INT. REV. CODE § 115(f) (1).
The statute is phrased in the negative: "A distribution . . . shall not be treated as
a dividend to the extent that it does not constitute income to the shareholder within
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."
10. 318 U.S. 371 (1943). Justices Black, Murphy and Douglas dissented, taking
the view that the Macomber case should be overruled. The position of the majority
was that the statute as written did not raise the problem. A reading of the opinion
will leave little doubt as to the constitutionality of an express provision subjecting
all stock dividends to income tax.
11. 318 U.S. 604 (1943), affirming Sprouse v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 973 (9th
Cir. 1941) (which had reversed 42 B.T.A. 484), and reversing Strassburger v. Com-
missioner, 124 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1941) (which had affirmed a B.T.A. memo opinion).
Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented, being of the view that the Tax
Court (then B.T.A.) had applied the correct test of taxability. Present members
of the Supreme Court who did not participate in this decision are: Chief Justice
Vinson and Justices Burton, Clark, and Minton. If two or more of the new mem-
bers of the court should share the views of the dissenters, this decision of the Court
will not be followed. The precarious position of the decision is further apparent
from the fact that the only members of the majority who are still on the court dis-
sented from the Griffiths- decision.
12. For a discussion of this and other tests, see 1 MmuTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXAT oN 606-646 (1942). In general, under the "different interest" test,
if the new shares provide for any difference in rights or preferences, the dividend is
said to be taxable. The confusion stems from the Koshland case where the language
of the court referred to both a change in "proportionate interest", and the receipt
of a "different interest"; the factual situation being such as to support taxability
upon either test.
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in this situation and held that in neither instance was taxable income
received by the shareholder. The Court expressly stated that to constitute
income, the dividend must bring about a change in the "proportionate in-
terests" of the shareholders. Unfortunately, however, it was not made
clear whether the same result should be reached where there is no alteration
in the proportionate interest of the shareholders in the net "sets of the
corporation, but some change is effected in the relationship between various
groups of shareholders with respect to voting rights or their rights to future
income.'3 In the instant case the Tax Court takes the view that any altera-
tion in the relative rights of various groups of shareholders with respect to
future income of the corporation is sufficient to subject the dividend to tax.
The conclusion reached by the Tax Court in the instant case clearly
limits the Sprouse case to its exact facts. Although the court, in contrast
to its position when the Sprouse case was before it, carefully clings to the
"proportionate interest" test in determining taxability, it apparently regards
the slightest change in the taxpayer's proportionate interest in either future
income or net assets as meeting the requirements of the test. Analysis of
the facts clearly shows there was no change of any substantial character in
the proportionate interests of the common shareholders, and that the change
in the proportionate interests of the preferred shareholders had little actual
significance. Although the cases can be readily distinguished, as a practical
matter it is difficult to see how the shareholders in the instant case received
any greater benefit from the receipt of the stock dividend than the share-
holders in the Sprouse and Strassburger cases. To say that here there was
a change in the "proportionate interests", while in these earlier cases the
shareholders received only a "different interest" is not altogether satisfac-
tory. Perhaps the answer is that the rule of the Sprouse case is wrong, and
that if the present Supreme Court were faced with the problem again, it
would overrule or disregard its prior decision.1 4 In any event, if the instant
decision is sound, it would appear that every stock dividend will be con-
sidered taxable except where the distribution consists of: (1) common
stock on common stock; or (2) non-voting common on voting and non-
voting common, there being no preferred stock outstanding; or (3) pre-
ferred on common, there being only common outstanding prior to the divi-
dend.
Libel-Statement That Ancther Favors Communism Is Not
Libelous-Burden of Proof on Plaintiff to, Disprove Privilege-In
1946 Defendant newspaper printed what purported to be a speech by Plain-
tiff, a politician. The article untruthfully reported inter alia that plaintiff
had "apologized" for the existence of Communism in the Democratic party
by saying "'of course, we all have to have a little Communism today.'"
Plaintiff brought an action for libel and won a judgment. The Supreme
Court reversed both the trial court and the Superior Court 1 and entered
13. See Loundes, The Taxation of Stock Dh4dends and Stock Rights, 96 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 147, 152, 155 (1947); DeWind, Preferred Stock Bail-Outs, 62 Harv.
L. Rev. 1126, 1145-1149 (1949). Cf. Judge Chase, dissenting, in Strassburger v.
Commissioner, 124 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1941).
14. See note 11, supra; Loundes, op. cit. supra note 12, at 155; DeWind, op.
cit. .rnpra note 12, at 1145, 1154.
1. The opinion of the Superior Court is found in 165 Pa. Super. 276, 67 A.2d
730 (1949).
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a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant.2 McAndrew v. Scranton Republican
Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A. 2d 180 (1950).
Our law regards reputation as an interest worthy of protection; the
tort of defamation exists to safeguard that interest from the damaging
effects of lies.3 Hence a statement, which is false and which is capable of
producing "any perceptible injury to the reputation of another," consti-
tutes actionable defamation.4 One of the precise questions considered in
the instant case was whether defendant's falsification was capable of such
effect. The court searched through Webster's dictionary, John T. Flynn's
"The Road Ahead" and The Communist Party Platform of 1948 and
found that communism was but another form of socialism, that neither of
these "isms" advocated "anything unlawful," that both had "legal recogni-
tion" and a small popular following. The court concluded: "To say a
man is a communist or a socialist is not to defame him." 5 The decision
ignores the well-established principle in libel law that the defamatory char-
acter of a statement is not always to be determined by its logical or dic-
tionary connotation; rather the courts should take due account of existing
social norms and antipathies in ascertaining whether a falsification has
the capacity to bring another in disrepute.6  For this reason the
realities of world conditions have played and must always play a part
in shaping the law of libel.7 Close adherence to this principle has
led other courts to different conclusions than that reached by the sweep-
ing opinion in the instant case. Those jurisdictions have decided that a
person's good name can suffer when he is called "communist," 8 "Red," '
or "anarchist"; 10 and these statements constitute actionable libel. In-
deed, suspicions engendered by international tension have led courts to
even more far-reaching results. In the second circuit it is libelous to charge
that another is a "representative" 11 of the communist party. In the sev-
enth circuit it is libelous to charge that another is a "demagogue of the
extreme left" who behaves like a communist.' 2  Explicit in these decisions
is the realization that most Americans consider advocacy of communism
2. Another count in the complaint was founded on defendant's false report that
plaintiff had said that a political opponent, an ex-marine was using his uniform to
gain sympathy and votes in a forthcoming election. The court held that this misquo-
tation was not actionable defamation.
3. Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 445 (1915).
4. Collins v. Dispatch Pub. Co., 152 Pa. 187, 190, 25 Atl. 546, 547 (1893).
5. 72 A.2d at 784.
6. Peck v. Tribune Co. 214 U.S. 185 (1909); PROSSER, ToRTs 784-85 (1941);
Note, Community Segment in Defamation Actions, 58 YALE L.J. 1387 (1949).
7. It was a defamation to call a candidate for office a "Jacobite" in 18th century
England. How v. Prin, 7 Mod. Rep. 107, 2 Salk. 694, 87 Eng. Rep. 1128 (1702).
See further Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24, 31 E.D. Wash. (1943)
(defamatory to call plaintiff "a pal of the Japanese" in wartime); Choctaw Coal
and Mining Co. v. Lillich, 204 Ala. 533, 86 So. 383 (1920) (defamatory to call
another a "slacker" in wartime); cf. Christopher v. American News Co., 171 F.2d
275 (7th Cir. 1948); O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co., 356 Pa. 307, 51 A.2d
775 (1947) (defamatory to intimate that plaintiff is racially prejudiced and sympa-
thetic to Fascist beliefs).
8. Mencher v. Chesley, 270 App. Div. 1040, 63 N.Y.S.2df 108 (2d Dep't 1946);
cf. Gallagher v. Chavalas, 48 Cal. App. 2d 52, 119 P.2d 408 (1st Dist. 1941).
9. Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1926).
10. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News, 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 692 (1891). Cf.
Ogren v. Rockford Star Pub. Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919).
11. Grant v. Readers Digest, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied 326 U.S.
797 (1946).
12. Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947).
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as tantamount to criminal conduct; 13 not only do communists themselves
constitute a despised class but so also do the sympathizers and dupes who
aid their cause. 14 Even so, the instant case might have been carefully dis-
tinguished from these precedents. The court could have argued simply
that the quotation which was falsely attributed to plaintiff---"we all have
to have a little communism today"-does not seriously suggest that plain-
tiff was a communist sympathizer. But the court did not do that. It
assumed that the misquotation was capable of creating the impression that
plaintiff was in ""favor" of a "little communism." 15 So construed, the mis-
quotation seems capable of injuring plaintiff's reputation,' 6 and thus should
fall within the test enunciated by other jurisdictions."7
There was a second significant holding in the instant case. The court
abandoned a well-established Pennsylvania rule that in libel cases it is
entirely the defendant's burden to prove the existence of a qualified privi-
lege.: 8 The court adopted the rule of the Restatement of Torts, viz.: the
defendant need only prove that the "occasion" of his statement was privi-
leged and the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove "abuse" of that
occasion. "Abuse" is shown by evidence that defendant's motive and
grounds for making the charge were unjustified.19 In entering a judgment
n.o.v., the instant court held that the plaintiff had failed to carry the bur-
den of proving "abuse." 20 Consider the effect of this change upon future
libel actions brought by public figures. Obviously in such cases it is easy
for defendants to show a privileged occasion. The entire burden then shifts
to the plaintiff. As a practical matter, strict adherence to such a procedure
13. The repressive measures enacted by Congress and State legislatures against
the Communist Party are comprehensively summarized in notes in 1 STAN. L. Ray.
85 (1948), 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 381 (1948), and 34 VA. L. REv. 439 (1948).
Advocacy of Communism comes close to the criminal conduct in the Pennsylvania
Anti-Sedition Act, PA. STAT. ANN. c. 18 § 4207 (Purdon 1945).
14. ". . . since the basis for the reproach ordinarily lies in some supposed
threat to our institutions, those who fear that threat are not likely to believe that
it is limited to party members . . . [but includes] those who only dally and coquette
with them, and have not the courage openly to proclaim themselves." L. Hand, J.,
in Grant v. Readers Digest Association, supra note 11, at 735. To the same effect
see Spanel v. Pegler, mtpra note 12, at 623.
15. Unofficial opinion, p. 53-7.
16. At the trial several witnesses testified that they construed the statement to
mean that plaintiff favored communism, that his reputation had suffered greatly as a
result of the article. See the report of the case in the Superior Court supra note 1.
17. In holding that both counts of the complaint were not defamatory, the instant
opinion cited with approval the third circuit decision, Sweeney v. Philadelphia Record
Co., 126 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1942). That case adopted the libel per se rule (based
on a false analogy to the rules of slander) which allows the plaintiff to recover only
special damages unless the offending statement charges criminal conduct, professional
incompetency or a loathesome disease. That rule has been sporadically followed
in New York, but it has been severely criticized. See SEELMAN, LIBEL AND SLANDER
iN NEw YORK 34-65 (1933). Cf. Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co.,
122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941), abandoning the rule in the Second Circuit.
18. O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co., supra note 7; Bausewine v. Norris-
town Herald Inc. 351 Pa. 634, 41" A. 2d 736 (1945) ; Hartman v. Hyman & Lieber-
man, 287 Pa. 78, 134 AtI. 486 (1926); Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, 139 Pa. 334,
21 AtI. 154 (1891). Contra: Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404, 2 Atl. 513 (1886).
Semble Montgomery v. Dennison, 363 Pa. 255 69, A.2d 520 (1949) where the late
Chief Justice cited, with apparent approval, both rules.
19. 3 RESTATEMENT TORTS § 613 and comments. In certain cases excessive pub-
lication also will destroy the privilege, see § 604.
20. The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the meaning of privilege,
but instructed them that the burden was on the defendant to prove privilege.
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could often impose a most difficult barrier to recovery.2 1 The plaintiff
must produce evidence of his adversary's personal motives; he must lay
bare the sources of information upon which his adversary grounded the
alleged libel, and he must show that his adversary had no reason to place
credit upon those sources. This is the mandate of the Restatment rule.
But where such has been the formulation of the law in other jurisdictions
the courts have generally relaxed the requirements imposed upon the plain-
tiff.22 Above all, the defense of privilege should be used only to balance
the interest in promoting public discussion with the interest in preserving
the individual's reputation from reckless abuse.P Adoption of, and strict
adherence to the rigid evidential burdens imposed by the Restatement's
rule will hinder rather than hasten accomplishment of this result.
Oil and Gas-Natural Gas Act-FPC Jurisdiction Extends to
Natural Gas Moving Directly From Producing Wells to Consumers
if the Flow Crosses a State Line-East Ohio Gas Company owns and
operates a natural gas retail business solely in Ohio, selling gas to Ohio
consumers through local distributing systems. Most of this natural gas
is transported into Ohio from other states through pipe lines of several
other companies. Inside the Ohio boundary these interstate lines connect
with East Ohio's large high-pressure lines in which the imported gas flows
continuously to East Ohio's local distribution system. The Federal Power
Commission, after hearings on the determination of the cost of transporta-
tion in interstate commerce of natural gas by East Ohio,' found as facts
that East Ohio was a Natural Gas company and subject to the commis-
sion's jurisdiction under section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act.2  On appeal
the court held that the mere mechanical interstate piping of an interstate
movement of natural gas in East Ohio lines constitutes interstate trans-
portation and hence the FPC has jurisdiction over East Ohio Gas com-
pany. FPC v. East Ohio Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 266 (1950).
Prior to the passage of the Natural Gas Act in 1938 the business of
supplying local consumers of gas was considered a local business and thus
not a matter for federal regulation, even though the gas was brought in from
another state and drawn for distribution directly from interstate mains; and
this was held so whether the local distribution was made by the transporting
company or by an independent distributing company. The reason ad-
21. Cf. Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, supra note 18, where the same argument
was applied in holding that the burden should rightly be on the defendant.
22. Cf. Ashcroft v. Hammond 197 N.Y. 488, 90 N.E. 1117 (1910); Compare
Democrat Publishing Co. v. Harvey 181 Ky. 730, 205 S.W. 908 (1918) with Wein-
stein v. Rhorer 240 Ky. 679, 42 S.W. 2d 892 (1931) ; PRossER, TORTs 852 (1931).
23. See the opinion of Taft, J., in Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th
Cir. 1893). Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REv. 314 (1935).
1. The commission instituted the proceedings on its own motion and on com-
plaint of the City of Cleveland, Ohio. In the Matter of The East Ohio Gas Co., 1
F.P.C. 586 (1939).
2. Section l(b) of the Act states: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate com-
merce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, com-
mercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such
transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of
natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for
such distribution . . ." 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717(b) (1946).
3. See Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 309 (1924); Pa. Gas Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n., 252 U.S. 23 (1920) ; PUC v. Landon, 249 U.3. 236 (1919).
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vanced in support of this was that the local interest was paramount, and the
interference with interstate commerce, if any, was indirect and of minor
importance.4 The prime objective in enacting the Natural Gas Act, which
states that "transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce" comes
within the jurisdiction of the FPC,5 was to close the gap which was created
when a company transmitted natural gas across state lines to a company
which distributes locally to consumers and neither the sending nor receiving
state could regulate the wholesale rates to the distributor.6 It has been
judicially declared that the Act was to make state regulation effective by
adding the weight of federal regulation to supplement and reinforce it in
the gap created by prior decisions.7 Therefore, it appears that the whole
purpose of the Act was to bring under federal regulation that which the
states could not regulate and to leave to the state commissions control over
distributing companies, whether or not the gas moves in interstate com-
merce. s In the instant case the court declared that the transportation, not-
withstanding that the company distributed the gas directly to consumers,
comes within the express provision of the Act granting power to the com-
mission under section 1 (b) to regulate "transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce" since there is a continuous flow of natural gas in pipe
lines across state lines to the consumer.
The court in the instant case in interpreting the phrase "transportation
of natural gas in interstate commerce" made no distinction between trans-
portation of one's own .property for one's own local business and the busi-
ness of transportation for wholesale distribution involving public utility
relations. Such a distinction has been made in the interpretation of the
word "transportation" in the Interstate Commerce Act with the result that
in a situation as that presented here the transportation was held to be
merely an incident to the use at the end.9 The result should follow that
East Ohio's transportation of natural gas should not come within the pur-
view of the Act. Section 1 (b) of the Act; which is a declaration of policy
states that the Act shall apply to "the business of transporting and selling
natural gas". It is in light of that policy that section 1 (b) must be read.
It is, therefore, clear that section 1 (b) means that the Act shall apply to
the business of transporting natural gas in interstate commerce either for
hire or for sales for resale. This construction would be consistent with
4. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
H.R. 11662, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936); E.g., PUC v. Attleboro Steam &
Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927) (electricity); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., mtpra
(gas). Both of these cases held that the states were powerless to regulate interstate
wholesale rates.
7. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n., 332 U.S. 507
(1947); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
8 Hearings, suPra note 4, at 24; H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1937); FPC v. Pandhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949); Pan-
handle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n., supra; PUC of Ohio v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
9. Mr. Justice Holmes stated: "It would be a perversion of language . . . to
say that a man was engaged in the transportation of water whenever he pumped a
pail of water from his well to his house. So as to oil. When . . . a company is
simply drawing oil from its own wells across a state line to its own refinery for its
own use, and that is all, we do not regard it as falling within the description of the
Act (referring to the meaning of transportation in the Interstate Commerce Act),
the transportation being merely an incident to use at the end ... " The Pipe Line
Cases (U.S. v. Ohio Oil Co.), 234 U.S. 548, 562 (1914).
1950]
936 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98
the plain purpose of Congress to regulate only the interstate public utility
aspects of the natural gas business, that which the states have been unable
to regulate. However, the instant decision now being law, the consequences
of such decision must be considered. East Ohio has neither a rate nor a
service that the FPC can regulate. It has no rates for transportation or
for sales for resale.' 0 Hence, the only things which the commission can
regulate are (1) the books and records of the company; and (2) the grant-
ing of a certificate of convenience. This may result in an overlapping of
functions, if the state commissions which have up to this decision regulated
local gas distributing companies such as East Ohio continue such regula-
tion. In fact it might necessitate a natural gas company keeping two sets
of books and records in order to comply with the FPC and the state com-
missions. Furthermore it appears that not just a few natural gas com-
panies will be affected by this decision, the present holding suggests that
almost all natural gas companies distributing locally will come within the
jurisdiction of the FPC and that the legislation instead of supplementing
the state commissions, will in fact cause duplication of regulation." As
Mr. Justice Jackson said in dissenting in the instant case: "We should
not utilize the centralizing powers of the federal judiciary to destroy di-
versi'ties between states which Congress has been scrupulous to protect" .1
2
Public Officers-Official Bonds-Surety Liable for Act of Prin-
cipal in Uttering Defamatory Words Under Color of Office-As the
obligee of an official bond, conditioned that the principal, a police officer,
"should faithfully perform such duties as may be imposed upon him by law
or by the Commissioners of said city during said term of office", the plain-
tiff city brought this action on the bond on behalf of the relator. The
declaration alleged that the officer, while engaged in discharging the duty
imposed upon him by the plaintiff of inspecting parking meters, maliciously
uttered slanderous words to the relator under color of his office, and that
this act constituted a breach of the condition of the bond. The trial court
sustained defendant's demurrer on the ground that the condition of the
bond was not breached by the utterance of defamatory words by the prin-
cipal, so as to impose liability on the surety. Reversing this decision, the
court held that the surety is liable upon an official bond, conditioned for
faithful performance of duties, for any wrongful act of the principal done
under color or by virtue of office. City of Mullens v. Davidson et al., 57
S. E. 2d 1 (W. Va. 1949).
The liability of a surety on an official bond is not to be extended by
implication, but is limited to the terms of the obligation; ' however, if the
bond is given pursuant to a statute prescribing the duties of that office, the
provisions of the statute will be deemed to be incorporated into the condi-
tion of the bond, and the surety will be liable for a dereliction of those
duties,2 as well as for duties which are subsequently imposed by law.
3 As
10. See dissent in instant case at 275.
11. See DeVane, Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power Act
of 1935 and the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 30 (1945); See
note 8 mpra.
12. Instant case at 279.
1. City of Wilkes-Barre v. Rockafellow, 171 Pa. 177, 33 A. 269, 30 L.R.A. 393
(1895) : State v. Conover, 28 N.J.L. 224, 78 Am. Dec. 54 (1860).
2. People v. Shetler, 318 Ill. App. 279, 47 N.E.2d 732 (1942).
3. E.g., Rice Lake v. Jensen, 216 Wis. 1, 225 N.W. 130, 94 A.L.R. 609 (1934).
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the terms of the bond are usually expressed in terms favorable to the cor-
porate surety, the bond will be strictly construed in favor of the obligee.4
The act of an officer done by virtue of his office, i.e., an exercise of his
official duty, done in an improper manner plainly constitutes a breach of
the bond which will render his surety liable.5 There was some conflict of
authority as to whether the surety was liable for an improper act of the
officer which, although beyond his actual legal authority, was so similar to
the powers of the position that his action seemed reasonably to be of an
official character, i.e., under color of the office. This distinction between
acts virtui officii and colore officii has largely been abandoned 6 so that any
act of the officer done either under color or by virtue of his office will con-
stitute a breach of the bond.7 The surety is not liable for the private
conduct of the official, clearly outside of the scope of his office,8 but if the
officer, though in gratification of his feelings or resentment, assumes to act
as such under color of his office the surety will be liable.9 In the only
other case involving liability of a surety for defamation, State v. Claus-
meier,'0 the defendant was denied recovery on the bond for the act of the
sheriff in publishing a picture and description of the defendant. The
surety's demurrer was sustained on the ground that the sheriff was acting
neither by virtue or under color of his office, but in a personal capacity.
For reasons of public policy, the communications of public officers, made
in their official capacity, are conditionally privileged, which privilege is
defeated only by malice, or lack of probable cause. 1 When, as in the
instant case, that privilege is expressly alleged to have been exceeded under
color of office, the condition of the bond clearly renders the surety liable.
As noted by the court in the instant case, no sufficient reason exists
to differentiate the tort of uttering defamatory words from any other
wrongful act done by the officer under color or by virtue of his office. As
the personal motives and feelings of the officer are irrelevant to the issue
of the surety's general liability, the fact that malice, existing in the mind
of the officer, made his activity actionable would not serve to preclude the
surety from liability. Perhaps more than any other public officer in our
society, the municipal police officer is in a position to irreparably damage
reputations. His office often obliges him to speak and the respect with
which his words are received by other citizens successfuly effects his
malicious intent. However, because of that duty to speak and the officer's
4. See e.g., State v. Roberts, 129 W.Va. 539, 40 S.E.2d 841 (1946). However,
the surety is not to be held beyond his intention as expressed in the contract, and
the contract of a corporate surety is generally accorded general rules of contract
construction. See, STEARNS, LAw OF SURETYSHIP 404-5 (Feinsinger, 4th ed. 1934) ;
TREANOR, Rationale of Corporate Suretyship Decisions, 3 IND. LJ. 105, 201 (1927).
5. State v. Conover, 28 NJ.L. 224, 78 Am. Dec. 54 (1860).
6. American Guaranty Co. v. McNiece, 111 Ohio St. 532, 146 N.E. 177, 39
A.L.R. 1289 (1924) ; Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227, 236 Pac. 220, 39 A.L.R. 1297
(1925) ; Lee v. Charmley, 20 N.D. 570, 129 N.W. 448, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 275 (1910).
7. Village of Barboursville ex rel. Bates v. Taylor, 115 W.Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485,
92 A.L.R. 1093 (1934) ; MEcHEM, PUBLIC OFFICERS § 284 (1890) ; MURFREE, OFFICIAL
BONDS § 303 (1885).
8. E.g., Massey v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 280 Ky. 23, 1325 S.W.2d 530
(1940). (Surety not liable on bond for assault of marshal upon citizen at outgrowth
of argument over citizen's dog).
9. E.g., Cain v. Skillin, 219 Ala. 228, 121 So. 521, 64 A.L.R. 1022 (1929). (State
law enforcement officer shot person causing a disturbance which annoyed the officer
and his family).
10. 154 Ind. 599, 57 N.E. 541, 50 L.R.A. 73 (1900).
11. Iddings v. Houser, 237 Ill. App. 236 (1925); Raymond v. Croll, 233 Mich.
268, 206 N.W. 586 (1925).
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intimate and often unpleasant association with a great number of people,
it would seem that this decision would encourage litigation and broaden
the surety's liability. But, in view of the fact that official bonds are con-
tracts of suretyship, plus the known difficulties of proving malice, it is
safe to predict that premium rates will be virtually unaffected even though
an unprecedented number of actions on official bonds were to occur as a
result of this case.
12
Removal of Cases-Federal Jurisdiction Not Defeated by Ad
Damnum Under Jurisdictional Amount-Plaintiff's complaint in
Workman's Compensation suit alleged total permanent disability but
prayed damages "not exceeding $3000." Defendant removed to federal
court under removal statute for diversity of citizenship' and federal court
denied plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that a party may not defeat
federal jurisdiction by praying judgment below jurisdictional amount if
he would clearly be entitled to more. Capps v. New Jellico Coal Co., 87
F. Supp. 369 (E. D. Tenn. 1950).
In addition to diversity of citizenship federal jurisdiction is contingent
on the existence of a controversy in excess of $3000.2 Generally, this
determination is controlled by the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover in
his complaint, especially so in actions solely for money damages.8 Where
plaintiff seeks federal jurisdiction he must be able to show that the neces-
sary mount is claimed in good faith,4 but plaintiffs have been able to avoid
federal jurisdiction by waiving part of a greater claim even though their
sole purpose in doing so was to avoid federal jurisdiction. 5 However, if
a determination of rights exceeding $3000 is involved, defendant may re-
move to the federal forum even though the money claim is under the
requisite amount,6 e.g., where there is a money claim for trespass but title
to valuable lands is in question. Moreover, where a compensation award
is payable in installments covering the length of a disability period, the fact
that subsequent events may reduce the aggregate payments below $3000
will not oust federal jurisdiction.7 In the instant case, plaintiff's ad
damnum for "less than $3000" would seem to foreclose him from receiving
payments over that amount-though the disability continued. The possibility
of later amendment of the complaint to seek an increased award does not
affect the problem since the issue could then be removed by defendant at
any time.8 Plaintiff, however, may prevent removal although his original
declaration involves the requisite amount if he amends and waives part of
his claim before defendant attempts to remove.
9  Similarly, a litigant may,
12. While essentially a contract of suretyship, public official bonds have many of
the characteristics of insurance, in that they have had more moderate fluctuations in
premium and loss experience than other types of surety bonds, and in that premiums
are the chief source of claim payment. BACKMAN, SuRETY RATE-MAKING 58, 62
(1949).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1946).
2. Ibid.
3. See St. Paul Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) ; Swann
v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 116 Fed. 232, 235 (W.D. Ky. 1902).
4. See St. Paul Indemnity Cab Co. v. Red Cab. Co., supra at 288.
5. Brady v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 68 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1933);
Woods v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n., 34 F.2d 501 (E.D. Ky. 1929).
6. Harrison v. Grandison Co., 34 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. La. 1940).
7. Flowers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 330 U.S. 464 (1946).
8. Barber v. Boston & M.R. Co., 145 Fed. 52 (C.C. Vt. 1906).
9. Anderson v. Western U. Tel. Co., 218 Fed. 78 (E.D. Ark. 1914); Maine v.
Gilman, 11 Fed. 214 (C.C. Maine 1882).
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by remittitur, prevent an adversary from suing out a writ of error where
the writ is dependent upon a jurisdictional amount. 10 This court's holding
that plaintiff's own limitation on his right to recovery did not defeat re-
moval represents an expansion of federal jurisdiction in contradiction of
former decisions.
The original grant of federal diversity jurisdiction stemmed from the
apprehension of local prejudice "I but nationalization has reduced this
hazard to such a minimum today that many eminent writers have urged
the abandonment of all diversity jurisdiction.12 Prior to Erie v. Tompkins
the choice of forum had a greater value to litigants than today. At that
time the law administered in the federal courts might have differed sub-
stantively from that in the state courts.' 3 Today, the different procedural
rules of the federal courts may still make the choice of forum extremely
valuable. Moreover, as the docket of one forum is more congested than
the other, so the value of a choice increases. Unless the congestion of the
Tennessee state courts or the nature of local procedural law seriously
prejudiced the rights of defendant, it is difficult to find any policy argument
supporting this decision.
Trade Regulation-State Held to Be a Person Under California
Unfair Practices Act-The district attorney of San Joaquin County
brought a civil action to enjoin alleged violations of the California Unfair
Practices Act.' The Act, in addition to providing for criminal sanctions,
stipulates that "Any person or trade association may bring an action to
enjoin and restrain any violation of this chapter, and in addition thereto,
for the recovery of damages." 2 This is the only section of the Act which
provides for an injunction. The word "person" is defined as "any person,
firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, cor-
poration or municipal or other public corporation." 3 Held: The state is
a proper party plaintiff.4  People v. Centr-O-Mart, 214 P. 2d 378 (Cal.
1950).
Together the Sherman Act 5 and the Clayton Act 6-often referred to
collectively as the Sherman Act-are closely analogous to current unfair
10. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Horn, 151 U.S. 110 (1894); Pacific Postal Tel. Co.
v. O'Connor, 128 U.S. 394 (1888).
11. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BusIN~ss OF THE SUPREmE CoURT 64 (1927).
12. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 530 (1928); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928) ; Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. ZEv. 132 (1923).
13. In Woods v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n., supra, a plaintiff was able
to recover $2000 on an insurance policy for a much greater sum in a suit in a state
court while the federal courts would have enforced a provision in the policy limiting
the time in which suit could be brought to 60 days and thus deprived plaintiff of any
recovery at all.
1. CAL. STAT. ANN., BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE §§ 17000-17101 (Deering
1944).
2. Id. at § 17070.
3. Id. at § 17021.
4. Two justices -dissented on the grounds that the word "person" does not ordi-
narily include the sovereign, either in common usage or as used in legislation; and,
relying on United States v. Cooper, that there was nothing in this particular instance
to show a different legislative intent.
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1940).
6. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1946).
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trade legislation; and it is under the former that the issue here involved
has priricipally arisen. The Supreme Court decided in United States v.
Cooper7 that the federal Government is not entitled to maintain a civil
action, on its own behalf, for damages under the Sherman Act. The de-
cision was based on the fact that there was specific provision for criminal
prosecution or suit for injunction by the Government, yet no such specific
reference in the damage section. The case was widely commented upon
and criticized; 8 and shortly thereafter the Supreme Court took a less
categorical stand by holding that the State of Georgia, suing under the
Sherman Act and lacking the injunction and criminal powers given the
federal Government, was entitled to bring a damage action on its own
behalf.9 Additional evidence of current dissatisfaction with this state of
the law is the fact that bills are now pending in Congress 10 to amend the
Sherman Act to specifically include the federal Government in the current
damage sections. The instant case is the first one to squarely face the
problem under a state statute and indicates that here is one state at least
which is unwilling to follow the narrow Supreme Court ruling. The court
specifically decided only that the State was a proper party to bring an
injunction; yet the injunction and damage provisions are so closely cor-
related under the California Act that it seems highly improbable that the
court would reach a different result in a damage action.
The cases on government regulation of business are split as to whether
a government is a "person", as that term is used in legislation." However,
the decision in a given case should hinge on policy, rather than an exercise
in definitions. Since the latter part of the last century, business in the
United States has been increasingly carried on by corporations, 12 which
have in turn grown in size and scope. It soon became obvious that some
means of control would have to be developed. The decision was made that
there was nothing inherently wrong or dangerous with "bigness" in busi-
ness; 13 that what was really needed was a control of monopoly by insuring
the survival of competition. One of the methods of achieving this result
was the provision for damage actions by those who are injured by unfair
business practices. However, the cost and complications of bringing such
a suit, especially in the case of treble damage actions, are often enormous.14
Consequently, very few individuals have taken advantage of this remedy.:"
On the other hand, government supervision by means of criminal prosecu-
tion or injunction is also demonstrably inadequate.' 6 The maximum fine
under the Sherman Act is $5,000.00,17 under the California Statute
$1,000.00.'s Obviously in business transactions of any size the gain to be
realized more than offsets the possibility of such a fine. There is therefore
7. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
8. 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 243 (1940) ; 21 B. U. L. Ray. 535 (1941) ; 29 CALIF. L.
REV. 657 (1941) ; 35 ILL. L. REV. 223 (1940) ; 40 MIcH. L. REv. 149 (1941) ; 26 VA.
L. REv. 958 (1940).
9. State of Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
10. H.R. No. 5117, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; H.R. No. 7905, 81st Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1950).
11. See 21 B. U. L. REv. 535, at 538 et seq. (1941).
12. NAT. REsouRcEs Co?.im., THE STRUCFURE OF THE AmmIcAx ECON0xoy (1939).
13. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
14. OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 829 (1948).
15. 63 HARV. L. REv. 907, 908 (1950).
16. OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 14, at 827.
17. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1940).
18. CAL. STAT. ANN., BusiNEss AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17100 (Deering 1944).
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a definite and recognized need for more effective enforcement measures.
The very least which is consistent with an effective enforcement policy is
to allow federal and state governments to bring a civil action for damages
where they are directly injured, i.e., in sales to state agencies. Mr. Justice
Black, dissenting in the Cooper case, stated that it would require clear and
unequivocal language to persuade him that Congress intended to exclude
the body which purchases more goods and services than any other single
purchaser. 19 The procedural advantages of a civil action, as compared to
a criminal action,2 0 would also facilitate enforcement. An even more effi-
cacious policy would be to permit suits by federal and state governments
on behalf of injured individuals who, as has been pointed out, do not
usually have the means to maintain suits in their own behalf. This threat
of government action would provide a greater deterrent on prospective
violators and consequently result in more effective regulation, and therefore
basically a more competitive system. Until that more extreme stage is
reached, the California Supreme Court has taken a definite step in the right
direction-one which avoids the necessity of legislative amendments.
Workmen's Compensation-Contractual Disability Prevents Re-
covery Where Claimant's Employer Is His Wife-Plaintiff was em-
ployed at a weekly wage in his wife's embroidery business. He was injured
while working and filed a claim for compensation, joining as defendants
his wife and the insurance company. The Workmen's Compensation
Bureau dismissed the claim, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
there could be no recovery without a valid contract of employment and
that under the common law rule, still in effect in New Jersey, contracts
between husband and wife were void.' Bendler v. Bendler, 69 A. 2d 302
(N. J. 1949).
Many cases in New Jersey and other jurisdictions have held that
there must be a valid contract of service, express or implied, to permit
recovery of workmen's compensation.2 Recovery has been refused where
no such contract existed, as in cases involving illegal agreements.a Some
jurisdictions, however, have held that a minor, illegally employed because
under the proper age, may still receive compensation.4 As to the validity
of contracts between husband and wife, most states by statute have com-
pletely removed the married woman's common law contractual disability.5
A few, including New Jersey, still provide that, with certain exceptions,
contracts between husband and wife are void at law.6 New Jersey courts
19. United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600, 615-616 (1941).
20. Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcemeint, 49 YA.E L.J. 284, 286-287 (1939).
1. "Nothing in this chapter contained shall enable a husband or wife to contract
with or to sue each other, except as heretofore, and except as authorized by this
chapter." NJ. STAT. ANN., tit. 37, c. 2-5 (1940).
2. E.g., In re Humphrey, 227 Mass. 166, 116 N.E. 412 (1917) ; Brower v. Franklin
Township, 119 N.J.L. 417, 197 Atl. 367 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Lehman v. Commissioners
of Northumberland Co., 87 Pa. Super. 440 (1926). The Workmen's Compensation
statute speaks of the "agreement" between the employer and employee and the "con-
tract of hiring". N.J. STAT. ANN., tit. 34, c. 15-7,8,9, (1940).
3. E.g., Boyle v. Van Splinter, 101 N.J.L. 89, 127 Atl. 257 (1925) (boy below
legal age working with dangerous machine) ; Snyder v. Morgan, 9 N.J. Misc. 293,
154 Atl. 525 (C.P. 1931) (bartender during prohibition).
4. "The contract is not of that type which is wholly void and from which no
enforceable rights can arise." Pierce's Case, 267 Mass. 208, 211, 166 N.E. 636, 638
(1929). See also Noreen v. Vogel & Bros., 231 N.Y. 317, 132 N.E. 102 (1921).
5. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAx FAMILY LAWS, §§ 151-156 (1935).
6. See note 1 supra.
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have, however, enforced many such agreements in equity when demanded
by justice,7 charging the wife's obligations against her separate property.8
The effect of a contract between spouses upon recovery of workmen's
compensation has seldom been considered in court, and where it has, the
results have varied with the jurisdictions' rules as to the validity of con-
tracts between the husband and wife.0 In New Jersey recovery was denied
once before in a lower tribunal.'0 Since that case the Constitution of 1947,
replacing the separate appellate courts of law and equity with one Supreme
Court, has been adopted," and the dissenting judges argued here that the
equitable rule enforcing contracts between spouses should now prevail.12
The court held that the new constitution combined law and equity only as
to administration, and that there was no change in the substantive law
such as to allow a recovery. 18
Although obviously anachronistic, 14 the instant decision can be de-
fended on the ground that it is based on the words of the statutes and
holdings of previous cases,15 and that it is not the function of courts to
change the law. That this result is not necessarily dictated, however, is
shown by a more thorough consideration of the statutes and of the charac-
ter of workmen's compensation legislation. It has been repeatedly stated
by courts that compensation laws were passed to remedy injustice caused
by denial of recovery on narrow common law grounds and that such laws
should be liberally construed.'8 Under these circumstances, the enforci-
bility of this agreement in equity and the joinder of law and equity courts
under the new constitution should be sufficient to allow a liberal court to
find that this was such a "contract" as would support a compensation
recovery.' 7 This viewv is reinforced by the fact that the policy reasons
behind the common law disability of husband and wife to contract with
and to sue each other do not apply here. There is no chance for dissension
in the family since the employer is required to insure his employees,' 8 and
the real party in interest is therefore the insurance company. Although
the infrequency of employment of one spouse by the other may seem to
make this case relatively unimportant, the failure of the court to grant
recovery indicates an overly conservative approach which may stand in
the way of progress in other fields of law.
7. E.g., Fike v. Fike, 3 N.J. Misc. 485, 128 Ad. 849 (Ch. 1925). aff'd per curiam,
99 N.J. Eq. 424, 132 Atl. 922 (1926) (wife given damages for breach of agreement
by husband) ; Demarest v. Terhune, 62 N.J. Eq. 663, 50 Atl. 664 (Ch. 1901) (recovery
by husband on wife's promissory note) ; Garwood v. Garwood, 56 N.J. Eq. 265, 38At1. 954 (Ch. 1897) (foreclosure of chattel mortgage given by husband to wife).
8. See POmEROY, EQuIrrY JURISPRUDENcE, §§ 1121-1126 (5th ed. 1941) for an
explanation of this doctrine.
9. Recovery granted: Reid v. Reid, 216 Iowa 882, 249 N.W. 387 (1933) ; Nesbit
v. Nesbit, 102 Pa. Super. 554, 157 Atl. 519 (1931) (contracts by spouses allowed in
these jurisdictions). Recovery denied: Wilhelm v. Industrial Comm., 399 Ill. 80, 77
N.E.2d 174 (1948) (statutory prohibition of compensation between spouses);
Flaherty's Case, 85 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1949); In re Humphrey, supra (contracts
by spouses void in Massachusetts both at law and in equity).
10. Maurello v. Maurello, 10 N.J. Misc. 950, 161 At. 844 (Dep't. of Labor 1932).
11. N.J. CONST. Art. VI, § 1, par. 1.
12. Instant case at 309.
13. Id. at 307.
14. The continuing trend to remove restrictions from married women is illustrated
by the fact that the New Jersey legislature provided in 1945 that a wife could form
a partnership with her husband. NJ. STAT. ANN., tit. 37, c. 2-16.1 (1940).
15. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
16. E.g., Sanders v. Jarka Corp., 1 N.J. 36, 61 A.2d 641 (1948); Gliewe v.
Mulberry Metal Stamping Works, Inc., 125 N.J.L. 555, 16 A.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
17. See note 3 supra.
18. N.J. STAT. ANN., tit. 34, c. 15-77, 78 (1940).
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